Op-ed: The recently released data on the drop in IDF recruits’ motivation to serve as combat soldiers cannot be a surprise to the IDF. This time around, instead of blaming it on changing attitudes in Israeli society, it would behoove the army to follow through on the benefits its fighters deserve.

Truth be told, the last one that should be surprised by the dramatic decline in young Israelis’ signing up for combat service should be the IDF itself. Make no mistake: the data indicating that the level of motivation has fallen to depths that have not been here since the Second Lebanon War is indeed cause for concern. But the army has no excuse to view them in astonishment. It did not start yesterday, and if we were to rely on the way the IDF has been responding to it, it is not going to end tomorrow.

There was no reason to wait for the summer of 2017 to identify this trend. The writing was already on the wall in November, 2013. At the time, though, IDF Manpower Directorate Head, Maj. Gen. Orna Barbibai chose to minimize the severity of the situation. When hearing her response to the drop in motivation, one is reminded of the joke about the person who fell from her 40th place, who as he reached the 20th floor said that for the moment everything was alright.

At the time, Barbibai stated, “I’m not troubled.” The big question then should have been how the person whose job is to deal with this matter isn’t troubled. Three years earlier, 79 percent of IDF recruits wanted to serve in combat units, and in 2013 only 70 percent expressed a similar interest—a decrease of nine percent during a relatively calm period, free of any serious crisis of confidence in the IDF such as the one that came after the Second Lebanon War.

Barbibai (Photo: Gil Nehushtan)
Barbibai (Photo: Gil Nehushtan)

 

Moreover, data gathered by the Manpower Directorate during that period—which one would hope the Manpower Directorate head was aware of—showed that Barbibai’s optimism had no basis to rely on; for even then we were told that the recorded drop was part of a continuous trend that was likely to grow in the years to come—which indeed happened.

Additional data, incidentally, showed that there was a continuous increase in the number of exemptions granted for medical and other reasons. In other words, the general trend of military service evasion, which peaked after 2006 at 27.5 percent, approached this percentage in 2013, as well.

Photo: IDF Spokesperson's Unit
Photo: IDF Spokesperson’s Unit

 

For reasons that, in hindsight, are difficult to understand, the IDF Operations Directorate had updated the definitions of “fighter” and “combat soldier” during that same period. The new the combat definition included cyber defense soldiers men and the Iron Dome operators, but removed, for example, aircraft mechanics and combat paramedics. This created not only confusion but also frustration. “According to the new definitions,” someone sarcastically wrote. “A fighter is not the UAV operator, but the UAV itself.” And since the new definition attempted to refer to those who risk of life in times of war, a proposal was made to define all the residents of Tel Aviv as fighters, as well.

In other words, the fact that the army is now formulating a plan that will give significant priority to its fighters, both in terms of recognition and prioritization (salary, release benefits, post-service deposits), is indeed necessary. But the big question is what will come of all this.

Recent data on to the benefits promised to reservists—whose numbers are also declining—show that unfortunately there is a large gap between what has been promised them and what has actually been provided. Of the six significant benefits they are supposed to receive, two are not implemented at all and one is only partially implemented. As such, only half of the promises made to them have been implemented.

All this remains incredibly relevant, since whoever chooses combat service knows that at the end of his three years of service he has another twenty years of reserve duty waiting for him.

Charlie Azaria (L) and his son, Elor (Photo: Shaul Golan)
Charlie Azaria (L) and his son, Elor (Photo: Shaul Golan)

 

And so, to summarize, the initial diagnosis phase has been successfully passed by the army. Now it has to show a convincing prognosis: this can be achieved by correcting the definition for who constitutes a fighter soldier; properly handling the large number of infantry soldiers, most of whom deal with burdensome and difficult tasks devoid of splendor or glory; improving their service conditions; significantly reward them and restore the old glory of their service. All this instead of chalking up the loss of motivation to changes in Israeli society—a “me first” and of “us” mentality. We must find ways to produce this lost motivation, and also to take into account, however unpleasant, “the Elor Azaria Effect,” which despite denials by the IDF exists and must be dealt with. The Azaria case was not the army’s finest hour, and it did not it come to an end when he entered prison.

As reported by Ynetnews